Why The Resulting Trust Presumption Doesn't Follow Your RRIF Or TFSA

A recent Ontario Superior Court decision has clarified a contested and consequential question in estates law: does the presumption of resulting trust — the principle established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pecore v. Pecore — apply to beneficiary designations on registered accounts like RRIFs and TFSAs? In Kunka Estate v. Giasson, 2026 ONSC 1842, Justice Horvat answered that question definitively: it does not.

Siegfried Ernest Kunka (“Ernie”) was the common-law partner of Rose Marie Olar for over thirty years. Following Marie’s death in November 2021, Ernie inherited her estate, including her TFSA and RRIF. In early 2023, Ernie changed the beneficiary designations on both registered accounts from his stepchildren, Mills and Olar, to his friend and companion, Angele Giasson.

Ernie passed away in August 2023. His will named Mills and Olar as equal beneficiaries of his estate — but made no mention of the TFSA or the RRIF. 

Mills, acting as estate trustee, brought an application seeking to have the registered account proceeds revert to the estate. She argued two grounds: first, that the Pecore presumption of resulting trust applied to the designations; and second, that the designations were the product of undue influence by Giasson.

The court rejected both arguments.

The presumption of resulting trust, as articulated in Pecore, holds that a gratuitous transfer from a transferor to an adult recipient is presumed not to be a gift; the burden falls on the recipient to prove the transferor intended a gift.

Mills argued this presumption should apply to the RRIF and TFSA designations, which would shift the onus to Giasson to prove Ernie intended to benefit her.

Justice Horvat disagreed, and in doing so, expressly declined to follow the 2020 decision in Calmusky v. Calmusky, which had extended the Pecore presumption to registered account designations.

The court’s reasoning turned on a fundamental distinction: Pecore was decided in the context of an inter vivos transfer; specifically, a father adding his adult child as a joint account holder while he was still alive.

A RRIF or TFSA beneficiary designation is categorically different.

The designated beneficiary acquires no interest in, access to, or control over the funds during the account holder’s lifetime. The transfer occurs only on death. That distinction, Justice Horvat held, is dispositive.

The court drew further support from Part III of the Succession Law Reform Act (“SLRA”), which expressly permits an account holder to designate a beneficiary for registered plans, including RRIFs and TFSAs, and requires the administering institution to pay out in accordance with that designation on the holder’s death. The legislation, the court found, clearly signals that registered accounts are meant to be governed by their designations, not subjected to a resulting trust analysis.

Justice Horvat also relied on two binding Court of Appeal decisions that Calmusky had not considered: Amherst Crane Rentals Ltd. v. Perring (2004) and Alger v. Crumb, 2023 ONCA 209. Together, those decisions establish that registered account designations are testamentary dispositions — not inter vivos gifts — and that the proceeds vest directly in the designated beneficiary, bypassing the estate entirely.

With no resulting trust presumption in play, the burden shifted to Mills to establish that Ernie actually intended the RRIF and TFSA to benefit the estate. 

He adduced no such evidence.

The fact that Ernie had updated both designations to name Giasson, and then updated his will three months later without mentioning either account, led the court to conclude that the separation was intentional.

Mills also alleged that Giasson had unduly influenced Ernie into changing the designations. The court confirmed that the threshold for undue influence is high: the challenger must establish on a balance of probabilities that the testator’s will was “actually overwhelmed” by “outright and overpowering coercion.”

Mills fell well short of that bar.

The affidavit evidence she relied on, from her brother, a neighbour, and a longtime family friend, amounted to opinion unsupported by direct observation.

Critically, the court noted that it was Giasson who had repeatedly placed limits on the relationship: she refused Ernie’s three marriage proposals and declined to accompany him to meetings with his lawyer.

That conduct, the court found, was difficult to reconcile with a theory of manipulation or undue influence.

The court also rejected Mills’ assertions about Ernie’s cognitive decline and susceptibility, finding no medical or expert evidence to support them.

Kunka Estate is a significant estates decision for several reasons.

The decision reinforces a practical point that estate planners and their clients must understand: RRIF and TFSA beneficiary designations operate outside the will. They are testamentary dispositions in form, but they are governed by the plan contract and the SLRA. 

Moreover, the undue influence analysis is a useful reminder of how high that evidentiary bar sits. Suspicion, opinion, and family grievance are not substitutes for direct evidence of coercion or overborne will.

Dealing with an estates litigation matter? Call us at 416.901.9984 or email info@pintoshekib.ca for a confidential consultation.